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Abstract
In this paper, under the assumption that green consumption has (at least par-
tially) a social/psychological dimension, we analyse the effect of a carbon tax when
it is imposed on consumers buying dirty products rather than on polluting firms.
The amount of the tax paid is determined by the share of brown consumers in the
market and the quality gap between variants. We show that this tax can abate
emissions without inducing the undesirable relocation effect which can be observed
in the case when a unilateral climate policy is imposed on polluting producers.
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1 Introduction
”Barack Obama’s efforts to join a global carbon emissions pact en-
countered determined Republican opposition on Capitol Hill. To disarm
that resistance requires several things: an acceptance that human-made
global warming exists; overcoming an aversion to new taxes, and assur-
ance that American businesses will not be disadvantaged against foreign
competitors” (Financial Times, February 2017).
In this paper, we analyse the effect of a carbon tax when (i) it is imposed on con-
sumers rather than on firms, and (ii) it increases with the pool of brown consumers
and quality differential between a green and a brown product.
There is an open debate both in EU and in US about possible losses and benefits
deriving from an Environmental Fiscal Reform (EFR) and, in particular, on the
opportunity of using carbon taxes. Supporters of carbon taxes argue that they
could incentivize green behaviour and, thus, spread environmentally friendly habits
among producers and consumers. Further, since these taxes are based on the so
called polluter pays principle such that the economic agents who are responsible for
damaging the environment should suffer the cost related to their behaviour, they
comply with efficiency and equity requirements. The opponents of carbon taxes
point out however that, under carbon taxes, firms tend to transfer the higher costs
of production on consumers, thereby missing the equity requirement. Further, and
even worse, these taxes undermine the competitiveness of carbon intensive industries
and can induce relocation and carbon leakage effects.1 Not even they accept the
idea, somehow related to the so called Porter hypothesis, that a fiscal reform could
change polluting producers into leaders in clean technologies; or that the high price
of polluting good would induce people to find less expensive and energy efficiency
products thus promoting a green consumption behavior among people. In case of
relocation, no incentive to invest in green innovation would be provided to firms and
green habits are not yet significantly widespread.
The empirical evidence on relocation and carbon leakage effects is mixed. Still,
the theoretical arguments against carbon taxes cannot be easily denied and can
1Carbon leakage takes place when a unilateral climate policy aimed at abating emissions in
a region/country determines an increase in emissions in another region. See Sanna-Randaccio et
al. (2016) for a discussion on the short-term and long-term drivers of this phenomenon. See also
Bo¨hringer et al. (2017) for a recent theoretical contribution on anti-leakage measures.
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fuel skepticism about the effectiveness of these taxes in abating emissions without
penalizing industries’ competitiveness.
We do not reject these arguments but advance the hypothesis that they can
inspire a different public policy where consumers rather than firms are the direct re-
cipients of carbon taxes, which are mainly intended as a fiscal tool to shift consumers
from brown to green consumption habits.
The theoretical argument underlying our formal approach is that brown con-
sumption is not only a source of pollution but also and mainly a social phenomenon.
A large strand of literature shows that consumers are partially driven in their con-
sumption choice by some social norms which define rules of behavior and inter-
actions among individuals (Ostrom, 2000; Carlsson et al., 2010; Mantovani et al.
2017). These norms, which are enforced by internalized feelings and/or social sanc-
tions (Elster, 1989), when concerned with environmental issues, state that green
consumption is a habit displayed by good citizens. Accordingly, while buying clean
products, people feel to comply with a norm of worthy citizenship and, thus, obtain
a social/psychological benefit of social approval and self-esteem. Along the same
rationale, they suffer a social stigma when purchasing dirty products.2
To the extent that green goods are used by consumers/citizens to get a social
status (the status of good citizens), green consumption turns out to be a conspicuous
practice. Typically, conspicuous goods (Veblen, 1899) are chosen by consumers with
the main aim to exhibit their wealth or other specific characteristics so that they can
distinguish themselves from others.3 As immediate by-product, the social prestige
associated with the consumption of a good increases with the distance between this
good and the ones bought by other consumers: driving an expensive car (like Rolls
Royce or Bentley) confer a higher social benefit to the driver, the cheaper the cars
driven by the others; fashion designer clothes meet the aim to show that the person
who wears them is rich to the extent the others wear items which are out of style. In
a similar vein, since environmentally friendly products are intended by consumers as
a means to advertise their socially worthy behavior and, thus, obtaining social ap-
2In line with this argument, Owen and Videras (2007) and Videras et al. (2012) argue that
individuals who are more willing to behave according to civic and cultural norms and have more
social ties are also more willing to protect a public good, namely, the natural environment, while
Brekke et al. (2003) and Czajkowski et al. (2015) show that self image is central to recycling
behavior.
3We refer the interested reader to Mantovani et al. (2017) for an in-depth discussion on the
positional content of green goods.
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proval, the social benefit that consumers obtain when buying green good is affected
by the environmental quality distance between variants. Namely, the contribution
coming from green consumers to protect the environment is relatively more valu-
able, the cleaner the goods they buy compared with the brown products. Along the
same rationale, the dirtier the relative brown quality, the larger the damage that
brown consumers inflict to the environment and, thus, the worst their social image.
It is as if the conspicuous dimension of consumption beget a correspondence be-
tween the environmental quality ladder in the market and the social ladder in the
social community: the lower the environmental quality along the quality ladder, the
lower the ranking of the buyer along the social ladder. In our approach, the public
policy is shaped by this correspondence so that the social stigma penalizing the
socially blameworthy citizens (namely brown consumers) is immediately translated
into taxes which increase with the environmental quality gap.
Empirical evidence finds, however, that the effectiveness of the social dimension
as a driver of green consumptions depends on the share of brown consumers. When
few consumers decide to buy green products, the social stigma attached to not doing
it may be weak, since the dirty behavior is rather widespread and, thus, somehow
accepted as a common practice. In this circumstance, the social incentive to a re-
sponsible behavior turns out to be low. The results emerged from OPOWER, one
of the largest randomized field experiments in history, tend to confirm this state-
ment. OPOWER sent people home energy report letters, providing a comparison
between their energy usage and that of their neighbors. Also, customers obtained
energy conservation tips. OPOWER ran a program for 23 utilities, including 6
of the largest 10 utilities in the USA and 600,000 households. From the study, it
emerged that the intervention reduced average energy demand by 1.11% to 2.78%
from the baseline usage (Allcott, 2011). Similar findings are obtained by Carlsson
et al. (2010) when considering conformity in green consumption between males and
females in Sweden. Their findings are that the proportion of consumers choosing
environmentally friendly coffee over standard coffee plays a significant and positive
role in women’s willingness-to-pay for environmentally friendly coffee. Welsch and
Kuhling (2009) find that, in Germany, the use of solar thermal systems, the sub-
scription to green electricity and the purchase of organic food are all three affected
by the consumption patterns of reference persons. Salazar et al. (2013) analyse the
role of social pressure on consumption among students, lecturers and administrative
personnel in a university in the Netherlands. Individuals provided with information
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about their peers’ choice are three times more likely to ‘buy’ a sustainable product
than those acting without this information.
Moreover, whenever brown consumption habits are widespread, the environmen-
tal damage turns out to be an urgent and particularly significant problem since
emissions increase with the polluting goods which are in the market. So, there ex-
ists a twofold reason why carbon taxes should increase with the set of consumers
buying brown goods: the larger this set, the weaker the social pressure against brown
attitude and the more relevant the environmental damage.
We argue that carbon taxes can mimic the social pressure thereby counterbal-
ancing the possible weakness of social norms and, thus, containing the damage gen-
erated by brown consumption. Brown consumers get less socially/psychologically
frustrated when observing that their unresponsible behavior is rather widespread.
Accordingly, we relate taxes to the share of brown consumers in the market. The
larger this share, the higher the corresponding taxes that brown consumers pay: as
the social stigma induced by the norms runs down so that the environmental damage
increases with the diffusion of brown consumption, the fiscal penalty gets stronger.
The modeling framework
Formally, we adopt a model of vertical product differentiation with two firms
providing goods with different emission intensities per unit of production to a pop-
ulation of consumers: the high quality variant has lower emission intensity per unit
of production than the low quality product. Consumption is assumed to have a
social/psychological dimension so as to capture the above evoked correspondence
between the quality ladder in the market and the social ladder in the community
where people live. This dimension is exploited by the policy maker to design a
consumer-targeted fiscal policy where a monetary punishment (taxes) is inflicted
to blameworthy people buying the dirty variant, depending on the share of brown
consumers and the quality gap between variants.4
In a two stage game, with firms competing at the first stage in environmental
quality and at the second stage in price, we define the equilibrium configuration
of the market under the assumption that a policy maker taxes dirty consumers
(Section 3). Since the quality differential is determined by the quality choice of
firms, equilibrium taxes are endogenously found, with firms contributing to fix their
4Although the relevance of social rewards in providing incentives to those who perform activities
with positive externalities is well known in the literature (see, e.g., Arrow, 1970), to the best of
our knowledge it has never been exploited to define a fiscal environmental policy.
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amount. Then, we wonder how this equilibrium would change in the case the tax
were imposed on the brown producer (Section 4).
Although several arguments have been recently developed against energy subsi-
dies, they have been so far largely used worldwide, either as direct cash transfers
to producers and consumers, or as indirect support tools, such as tax exemptions
and rebates.5 Accordingly, we also describe an alternative scenario where the policy
maker subsidies green consumers and compare the effectiveness of consumer-based
taxes vsus subsidies (Section 5). Interestingly, our results are robust to alternative
assumptions of the model (Section 6)
We find that a consumer-targeted fiscal measure is always preferred over a firm-
based fiscal measure in terms of incentive to green innovations and, in most cases,
reduction of pollution damage. Interestingly, firms are never penalized by the fiscal
plan when it is targeted to consumers. At the opposite, when taxes are imposed
on the brown producer, they reduce firms’ profits and thus open the door to the
possibility of firms’ relocation. Moreover, and rather surprisingly, although a subsidy
never determines a reduction in profits, it may be environment detrimental, in the
case when it is granted to the green producer rather than to green consumers, since
it may increase total emissions in the market.
Finally, when comparing taxes and subsidies on consumers, under relative tax
the brown producer has a higher incentive to improve his/her environmental quality
and emissions can be lower. For example, in the case when a Government introduces
a rather low tax, or a massive fiscal intervention is planned in a country where the
green producer is highly environmentally virtuous, then a relative tax should be
preferred over a relative subsidy, since the former would reduce emissions more than
the latter. An immediate environmental policy implication is that the effectiveness
of fiscal plans – and their main effects on environment— changes with the features
(such as the state of the art technology) of the industry or country where it is
realized.
Our paper in the literature
Our analysis complements the literature on the effects of different environmental
policies on the equilibrium configurations when consumers are willing to pay more for
less polluting goods (see Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-
Fumero, 2002; Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003;inter alia). The entry point of
5See Gerlagh et al., (2009); Galinato and Yoder, (2010), inter alia, for a theoretical appraisal
of the opportunity of using taxes or subsidies.
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this literature is that products are equivalent in all characteristics but one: the
environmental quality. This attribute is ranked in the same way by all consumers
so that an environmentally friendly goods is ranked higher than a brown product
along a quality ladder. Thus, in a model of vertical product differentiation where a
green good is the high quality variant, with the brown alternative representing the
low quality one, this literature compares the effects of government policies, which
are typically intended as taxes/subsidies or minimum quality standards, when they
are imposed on firms.6
We extend this literature along two research lines. First, we assume that the
policy maker attributes a social content to green consumption and defines the envi-
ronmental policy accordingly. In order to relate the social dimension of green con-
sumption to the environmental policy, we borrow some ingredients from Ben Elhadj
and Tarola (2015). Starting from the idea that people seek a relative position among
peers and buy products, at least partially, for their social value, they introduce in
a vertically differentiated setting the notion of consumers’ relative preferences for
environmentally friendly products. These preferences link the utility from buying a
product to the relative position along the social ladder that this product can con-
fer to the buyer.7 In our model, this relative dimension of consumers’ contribution
represents one of the key ingredients of the government policy which is also shaped
by the share of brown consumers in the market. It is worth noting that this relative
dimension puts our paper particularly close to Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) where,
in a vertically differentiated market with an ad valorem tax on firms, a subsidy is
paid to green consumers depending on the quality gap between variants.8
Secondly, we describe the market equilibrium under the assumption that a fiscal
policy is targeted to consumers rather than firms and observe how this equilibrium
would change in the traditional setting of firm-based policies when taking into ac-
6A remarkable exception is Koonsed (2015) that considers an excise tax on consumers and a
subsidy for green consumers.
7The rationale underlying our analysis is that when buying green goods, consumers get a social
satisfaction behind the utility traditionally observed: this satisfaction increases with the quality
gap between green and brown products, as this gap determines the relative contribution of green
consumers to environment protection and thus their social position among peers. The role of
relative preferences for environmental goods are also analysed by Mantovani et al., (2016), and
Mantovani and Vergari, (2017), in a framework where the social content of a green good may be
in contrast with its intrinsic performance.
8In Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) this subsidy is however unrelated to the pool of consumers
buying one of the two variants existing in the market.
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count the social content of green consumerism.9
Also, we are somehow related to the literature concerned with the Porter hypoth-
esis. Contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which a stringent regulation
can reduce profits, Porter (1991) argues that environmental regulations can enhance
green investment thereby generating in the long run gains that can counterbalance
the costs faced to satisfy them.10 In our analysis, we show that a fiscal plan can
induce firms to increase the quality of their products with positive effects on the
equilibrium profits. Further, we discuss how these effects change, depending on the
nature of the plan (subsidy vsus tax) and the agent to which the plan is targeted
(consumers vsus firm).
Finally, we contribute to the debate on the incentive to relocate manufacturing
activities under unilateral climate policy. In a large strand of theoretical research,
several arguments are found both in favour and against the possible shift of do-
mestic activities abroad due to unilateral carbon taxes and the empirical literature
provides mixed evidence (Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2003; Ikefuji et al., 2016; Sanna
Randaccio et al., 2016). We discuss here how the possible incentive to relocation
changes with the recipients of carbon tax – consumers vsus producer – and try to
emphasize the reason for this finding to hold.
2 The model
Consider an uncovered vertically differentiated market with two firms H and L pro-
ducing two variants of the same good, namely uH and uL. Variants are homogeneous
in terms of hedonic quality but they are vertically differentiated in terms of pollut-
ing emissions. Without loss of generality, variant uH is assumed to pollute less than
variant uL so that the former (resp. latter) variant will be referred to as high (resp.
low) quality variant, with uH > uL.
11
When producing, firms incur quality-specific fixed production cost Fi. This cost
can be viewed as a cost of installing new machineries and equipment, or a cost
9To the best of our knowledge, defining an environmental policy on the basis of this social
content represents a novel approach in the policy oriented literature of environmentally economics.
10See on the Porter hypothesis Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, (1999); Andre´ et al., (2009) inter alia.
See also Lambertini (2013) for an in-depth review of the Porter hypothesis in the literature.
11In our model, like in Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007), Garc`ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs (2009) and Andre`
et al. (2009), we follow the traditional approach of vertical differentiation as in Mussa and Rosen
(1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) so that the variable ui mirrors the environmental quality
i.
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of technology adoption. As a such, it is typically assumed to be sunk when the
production starts.12 The cost associated with the cleaner variant uH is greater
than that associated with the dirtier product uL, so FH > FL. From a theoretical
viewpoint, this type of cost enables to abstract from any supply-side issue and,
thus, to identify the demand-driven effects of fiscal measures on the equilibrium
configuration. Following Andre` et al. (2009) and without any loss of generality, we
assume that FL = 0. Also, in spite of FH > 0, our assumption is that the quality
level uH is so high to guarantee that equilibrium profits of firm H are non negative.
Thus, we drop this cost from the equilibrium analysis for the sake of simplicity. We
discuss in Section 6 whether our findings are robust to an alternative and somehow
more traditional specification where costs are strictly convex in quality.13
Consumers are uniformly distributed in the interval [0, β] with density 1
β
and
characterized by the intensity of their environmental concern θ. Since the parameter
θ is proportional to the willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for environmental
quality, at θ = β the WTP is maximal. Each consumer is supposed to buy at most
one unit of variant which ensures to her the highest utility except if the alternative
of no purchase is better.
We analyse the following two-stage game. First, firms choose the optimal quality
of their variant along the spectrum of the technologically feasible quality, given by
the interval [umin, u¯] where umin > 0 represents the minimal quality required and u¯
the highest achievable quality according to the state of the art technology. Second,
they compete in prices. Then, we characterize market equilibrium configuration.
3 Carbon tax and brown consumption
We consider a scenario where brown consumption is taxed. The tax T depends on
the quality gap between variants, (uH − uL), and the share of the dirty consumers,
xtL. The idea underlying this modeling strategy is as follows. The tax represents a
monetary punishment for socially blameworthy consumers, namely, those consumers
that buying brown goods contribute to damage the environment. Since a dirty
behavior is relatively more detrimental, the cleaner is the green variant, this tax is
modeled by taking into account the quality gap between variants. Further, in order
to be effective in counterbalancing the diffusion of a brown attitude, this tax tends
12See on this Frondel et al.(2007) and Mantovani et al. (2017).
13Fixed costs are convex for example in Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002),
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Bre´card, (2013).
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to increase with the share of brown consumers.14
Accordingly, T = t(uH −uL)xtL, with t being the tax rate and t ∈ (0, 1), appears
as a negative component in the utility function of brown consumers.
Notice that this punishment changes with the distance between qualities along
the environmental quality ladder. As a such, it can be viewed as a relative tax. Fur-
ther, since the optimal quality ui, with i = H,L, is endogenously found, the actual
punishment T is endogenous and depends on the equilibrium choices of firms. This
reconciles the public dimension of the fiscal plan with a market-based mechanism:
the monetary punishment inflicted to brown consumers is partially determined by
firms, which increase the environmental quality of their products due to the con-
sumers’ attitude toward green and brown goods.
Formally, we define the indirect utility function from buying the brown variant
uL as follows:
15
UL (θ) = θuL − pL − T. (1)
A standard utility function of vertical differentiation is instead assumed for green
consumers, namely:
UH(θ) = θuH − pH . (2)
The indifferent consumer between the low quality variant and not buying at all, say
θtL, is given by
θtL(θ
t
H) =
pL + t(uH − uL)θtH
t(uH − uL) + uL (3)
where θtH represents the indifferent consumer between the two variants. This indif-
ferent consumer θtH is found from the following indifferent condition:
θtHuH − pH = θtHuL − pL − t(uH − uL)
(
θtH −
pL + t(uH − uL)θtH
t(uH − uL) + uL
)
14This tax can also capture the differential between the emissions observed due to the socially
blameworthy behaviour of consumers xtL buying the brown variant and the emissions which would
be observed if the brown consumers xtL bought the green variant uH . The former are proportional to
uLx
t
L while the latter to uHx
t
L. In this alternative view, this emissions differential [x
t
LuH − uLxtL]
enables to contrast the potential contribution that brown consumers could give to the environment
and the actual damage caused by their blameworthy behavior. Thus, it somehow provides a
correspondence between the social stigma which condemns this attitude along a social dimension
and its fiscal punishment along a monetary dimension, thereby representing an economic measure
of this socially irresponsible behaviour.
15At first sigh, this formalization recalls a network effect like in Bre´card (2013). We discuss in
Section 6 the difference between her approach and ours.
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which is satisfied at
θtH =
(uL + tuH − tuL) pH − pLuL
(uH − uL) (uL + tuH) . (4)
From (4), we get that:
θtL =
pL + tpH
uL + tuH
.
Notice that the above consumers’ maximization problem is solved by assuming ratio-
nal expectations about the size of the brown market share. Indeed, when optimally
choosing their variant, consumers take the decisions of the others as given and,
assuming rational expectations, at equilibrium the expected demand of brown con-
sumers coincides with its actual value. Assuming that both firms are active in the
market, that is, θtL < θ
t
H < β, demand functions are then,
16
xtH = β − θtH , xtL = θtH − θtL.
We solve the game by backward induction, thereby analysing, first, the price stage
and, then, moving to the quality stage.
At the price stage, firms maximize the following profit functions:
pitH (pH , pL) = x
t
H (pH , pL) pH and pi
t
L (pH , pL) = x
t
L (pH , pL) pL.
By solving the system of BRs, we find the pair of candidate equilibrium prices
pi(ui, uj), i, j = H,L and i 6= j as well as demands that we plug into the profit
functions. Next, solving for quality competition, we find the following result.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium qualities are u˜tH = u¯ and u˜
t
L =
2
7
u¯
(
1− t+√5t+ t2 + 1).
Proof. The profit function of the green producer is monotonically increasing in uH .
Given this, we obtain the optimal value of the brown variant from standard maxi-
mization of piL (u, uL) wrt uL.
The equilibrium prices p˜ti and the corresponding market shares x˜
t
i of firms H and
L are, respectively:
p˜tH =
1
4
u¯β and p˜tL =
1
28
u¯β
(√
t2 + 5t+ 1− t+ 1
)
,
x˜tH =
7
12
β and x˜tL =
7
12
β(1 +
√
t2 + 5t+ 1− t)
3t− 2√t2 + 5t+ 1 (t− 1) + 2t2 + 2 .
16We then verify that, indeed, at equilibrium, these conditions are satisfied, that is, the market
is an uncovered duopoly. This is our starting point in all scenarios analysed in the paper.
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Notice that the optimal quality u˜tL chosen by the dirty producer and the correspond-
ing price p˜tL increase with the tax, while the equilibrium market share x˜
t
L decreases.
The market share of the cleaner producer x˜tH is instead unaffected by the tax. The
rationale for the above findings can be captured as follows. On the one hand, the
optimal brown quality increases with the tax. This would enlarge, ceteris paribus,
the market share of the dirty producer. Still, the corresponding price of the brown
variant ptL increases with the tax, too. This raise pushes away from the market some
low-income consumers, which would have been willing to buy the dirty variant at
some lower price p˜L < p˜
t
L, but refrain from buying at this high equilibrium price. On
the other hand, consumers purchasing the cleaner variant are completely unaffected
by the presence of the tax: the tax moves upward the optimal quality of the brown
variant and this would induce some consumers buying the green good to switch to
the brown alternative, ceteris paribus. This switch, however, is refrained by the high
price of the brown good. As a result of these two contrasting forces, the equilibrium
market share of the green producer does not react to the tax. Not even the equi-
librium price p˜tH of the green variant changes with the tax. Although the optimal
price of the brown variant increases with this fiscal measure and prices are strategic
complements, the quality gap between variant (u˜tH − u˜tL) at equilibrium decreases
with t. Since the lower is the quality gap, the fiercer is the price competition, the
green firm does not find it optimal to change its equilibrium price, which accordingly
does not vary with the tax.
Finally, taxation does not determine any effect on both equilibrium profits that
write as:
p˜itH =
7
48
u¯β2, (5)
p˜itL =
1
48
u¯β2. (6)
When considering this result in the light of the debate on the relocation effects
which are possibly induced by a unilateral carbon tax, it immediately emerges that
no penalty is suffered by firms, which accordingly do not find any incentive to
relocate.17 It is worth noticing that this result departs from those which are typically
observed when a traditional carbon tax is introduced in a market.18 Moreover, as
it will be shown in the next section, the same argument cannot be extended to
17Indeed, formally, the equilibrium profits defined in (5) and (6) correspond to those under the
baseline scenario a` la Choi and Shin (1992), in the absence of policy intervention.
18In our setting, we contrast a ”traditional carbon tax”, intended as a fixed tax on emissions
and a relative carbon tax, whose actual weight depends on the quality differential.
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a relative tax imposed on the brown producer. In that case, relocation incentives
emerge.
In order to capture the effect of this tax on global emissions, we define pollution
damage as:
E˜t = E˜tH + E˜
t
L,
with E˜ti = (u
0 − uti)xti, i = {H,L} and the parameter u0 representing the zero
emission quality.19 Notice that, by definition, u0 ≥ u¯. So, it may happen that the
emission-free quality benchmark is not available in the market and thus u0 > u¯. 20
At equilibrium, total damage writes:
E˜t =
1
12
β
8u0t+ u0(
√
5t+ t2 + 1− 1)− 9u¯t
t
, (7)
with ∂E˜
t
∂t
< 0 given that the average environmental quality increases, while the
brown production as well as total production decrease with t.
We gather our findings as follows.
Proposition 1. The optimal quality of the brown variant increases with the tax on
brown consumption, while global emissions decrease. Both equilibrium profits are
unaffected by the tax so that an incentive to relocation does not emerge.
4 Carbon tax: consumption versus production
We next wonder whether the above results still hold in the more traditional scenario
where the fiscal policy is directly levied on firms rather than on consumers.
While keeping that the policy maker designs the fiscal plan based on the social
content of green consumerism, we assume here that the brown producer is taxed.
So, firm L’s profit writes as piftL (pH , pL) = x
ft
L
(
pL − t(uH − uL)xftL
)
, whereas profit
of the green firm is as in a traditional model of vertical differentiation, that is,
piftH (pH , pL) = x
ft
HpH .
21 Consumers’ preferences are standard, namely Ui = θui − pi.
19This function of total emissions resembles the traditional one (see for example Lombardini-
Riipinen, 2005), where emission differential are weighted for the quantity sold by firms.
20This formulation is quite general as it allows us to consider also the case in which u¯ = u0.
Although from a theoretical viewpoint, u¯ = u0 represents a particular case of our approach, casual
observations show that it holds in some sectors. For example, in the automotive sector the electric
car is emission-free.
21Superscript ft stands for firm-based tax.
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As a result, the indifferent consumers between buying good L and not buying at all,
and between buying good L and good H, are, respectively:
θftL =
pL
uL
, θftH =
pH − pL
uH − uL . (8)
Demands for the goods, assuming an uncovered duopoly, are then: xftL = θ
ft
H − θftL
and xftH = β − θftH .
Price competition leads to the following second stage prices:
pftH (uH , uL; t) =
2βuH (uH − uL) (uL + tuH)
uL (4uH − uL) + 2tuH (2uH − uL) ,
pftL (uH , uL; t) =
βuL (uH − uL) (uL + 2tuH)
uL (4uH − uL) + 2tuH (2uH − uL) .
with the corresponding second stage demands and profits being:
xftL (uH , uL; t) = βuH
uL
uL (4uH − uL) + 2tuH (2uH − uL) ,
xftH (uH , uL; t) = 2βuH
uL + tuH
uL (4uH − uL) + 2tuH (2uH − uL) ,
piftL (uH , uL; t) =
β2u2L (uH − uL) (uL + tuH)uH
(−u2L + 4uHuL + 4tu2H − 2tuHuL)2
, (9)
piftH (uH , uL; t) =
4β2u2H (uH − uL) (uL + tuH)2
(−u2L + 4uHuL + 4tu2H − 2tuHuL)2
. (10)
Solving for quality competition, we derive the following result.22
Lemma 2. The equilibrium qualities are uftH = u and u
ft
L = u˜
ft
L such Q
ft (t) =
u˜ftL
u
∈(
4
7
, 0.691
)
.
Proof. See Appendix (8.1.1).
Finally, pollution damage under relative tax on the brown firm writes as:
E˜ft = (u0 − u)2βu u˜
ft
L + tu
u˜ftL
(
4u− u˜ftL
)
+ 2tu
(
2u− u˜ftL
) (11)
+(u0 − u˜ftL )βu
u˜ftL
u˜ftL
(
4u− u˜ftL
)
+ 2tu
(
2u− u˜ftL
) .
Since ∂E˜
∂t
ft
< 0, we can conclude that this policy is always effective in reducing the
pollution damage.
Nonetheless, from direct comparisons, the following holds:
22We check that for any (uH , uL), second stage equilibrium prices are such that 0 < θL < θH < β.
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Proposition 2. A relative tax on brown consumers is more effective than a tax
on the brown producer (i) in terms of incentive to innovate and (ii) whenever the
cleaner variant is not extremely green, in terms of emissions reduction. Moreover, in
contrast with the tax on brown consumers, (iii) a tax on the brown producer reduces
the equilibrium profit of the brown firm at the benefit of the green one.
Proof. See Appendix (8.1.2).
Interestingly, the firm-based tax is less effective in terms of quality improvement.
At first glance, this result is counterintuitive since, under tax on brown consumers,
the fiscal policy affects firms’ decision in an indirect way. The intuition lies on the
fact that when the tax is levied on consumers, it decreases their willingness to pay
for the low environmental quality. Since the disadvantage suffered by the brown
rival is stronger, the larger is the quality gap, the incentive to increase the quality
of the dirty variant and thus contrasting this penalty turns out to be stronger in
this scenario than in the alternative one where consumers’ willingness to pay is
unaffected.
As for the pollution damage, numerical simulations show that whenever the ratio
u
u0
is sufficiently small, that is, the green variant is quite far from being emission-free,
then E˜t < E˜ft, whereas the contrary holds for u
u0
sufficiently high. In particular, for
any t, the emissions coming from the green firm are lower under consumer tax than
under firm tax, i.e. E˜tH < E˜
ft
H , because x˜
t
H < x˜
ft
H and the high environmental qualities
are equal, u˜tH = u˜
ft
H = u.
23 As for the emissions coming from the brown firm,
although the comparison is a priori ambiguous because both the low environmental
quality and quantity are larger under consumer tax than under firm tax (u˜tL > u˜
ft
L
and x˜tL > x˜
ft
L ), numerical simulations show that E˜
t
L > E˜
ft
L . So, E˜
t
H < E˜
ft
H but
E˜tL > E˜
ft
L . Whenever
u
u0
is small, so that u¯
u0
< uˆ(t), the former component prevails
over the latter and determines E˜t < E˜ft. On the contrary, when u
u0
tends to its
maximal level 1, E˜t > E˜ft since the latter component prevails.24
Finally, regarding the producer surplus, we observe that both firms prefer the
scenario where consumers are taxed rather than the alternative case in which the
tax is imposed on the brown producer. Indeed, it holds that p˜itH−piftH (uH , uL; t) > 0
and especially p˜itL − piftL (uH , uL; t) > 0.25 More precisely, under tax on consumers,
23Notice that x˜fti , with i = H,L, denotes the equilibrium quantity, namely x˜
ft
i = x
ft
i (u¯, u˜
ft
L ).
24In particular, when the green variant is emission-free ( uu0 = 1), it only matters the damage
coming from the brown firm. In this case, we observe that E˜t > E˜ft, for any t.
25In the Appendix (8.1.3), we show that, given uH = u, these inequalities hold for any uL and
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x˜tH and p˜
t
H are independent of t, whereas under tax on the brown firm x˜
ft
H and p˜
ft
H
increase with t; however, it always holds that p˜tH > p˜
ft
H and x˜
ft
H > x˜
t
H . As for the
low quality good, both quantities x˜tL and x˜
ft
L decrease and both prices p˜
t
L and p˜
ft
L
increase with t. However, it always holds that x˜tL > x˜
ft
L and p˜
t
L < p˜
ft
L . Overall,
the high quality firm prefers the consumer tax scenario because the larger price
in this scenario overcompensates the lower quantity; the same preference holds for
the brown firm: now, the larger quantity overcompensates the lower price. Notice
that, as the per-unit tax on the brown producer increases, the profit of the brown
firm decreases, thus entailing the traditional and unpleasant effect of reducing firms’
profits and providing an incentive to relocation.
Before concluding, we would like to consider whether taxing brown consumers
penalizes them more than the traditional measure of a tax which is targeted to
polluter producers.26 From a direct comparison between consumers’ surplus in each
scenario, it emerges that this surplus of brown consumers is higher when the tax is
directly levied on consumers rather than on firms. Indeed, under consumers-based
tax, the quantity is larger and the corresponding price is lower than under firms-
based tax. Rather surprisingly, the surplus of green consumers is lower under the
former scenario (consumers-based tax) than under the latter, in spite of x˜ftH > x˜
t
H .
This has to be attributed to the price gap (p˜tH − p˜ftH ) > 0. Accordingly, the brown
consumers, which could a priori represent the more damaged social category in
the case of a brown consumption tax, do not suffer in this case more than in the
alternative one, where tax is imposed on the brown producer. Further, ad hoc
redistributive policies can be undertaken with the primary goal to compensate the
possible harm inflicted to them.
5 Carbon tax or green subsidies?
So far, we have pointed out that taxing consumption rather than production can be
preferred from several points of view. For the sake of completeness, in the following
we briefly analyse and compare the effect of a subsidy, when it is either granted to
green consumers or to the green producer.
so, a fortiori, for the equilibrium uL = u˜
ft
L .
26We relegate to the Appendix (8.1.3) formal details on this.
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5.1 Subsidy and green consumption
In line with the previous setting, the subsidy S depends on the quality gap between
variants and the share of the dirty consumers, xsL. It represents a monetary reward
for socially worthy consumers, namely those consumers that buying green goods
contribute to protect the environment and it writes as:
S = s(uH − uL)xsL,
where s indicates the subsidy rate, s ∈ (0, 1). This subsidy appears as a positive
component in the utility function of the green consumers, which is, accordingly:
UH(θ) = θuH − pH + S, (12)
while the utility of consumer type θ when buying the brown variant is left unaffected
by this policy and it writes as
UL(θ) = θuL − pL. (13)
The indifferent consumer between buying the brown variant and refraining from
buying is, as in a standard model, θsL =
pL
uL
. As for the choice between the two
variants, consumer type θ buys the green variant H if and only if
θuH − pH + s(uH − uL)xsL > θuL − pL.
Denote θsH the consumer type that is indifferent between buying the brown and the
green variant so that, assuming, as before, that both firms are active in the market,
xsL = θ
s
H − θsL and xsH = β − θsH . The indifferent consumer among the two variants
is then such that
θsHuH−pH+s(uH−uL) (θsH − θsL) = θsHuL−pL ⇐⇒ θsH = pHuL−pLuL+spLuH−spLuL(s+1)(uH−uL)uL .
Firms’ profits are then pisi (pi, pj) = x
s
i (pi, pj) pi, with i, j = H,L and j 6= i.
We solve the game by backward induction. So, starting from the price stage, we
then move to the quality competition thereby solving for the optimal qualities.27
Lemma 3. The equilibrium qualities are u˜sH = u¯ and u˜
s
L = u¯
s+4
s+7
.
Proof. The profit function pisH (uH , uL), is monotonically increasing in uH . Given
this, u˜sL follows from standard maximization of pi
s
L (u¯, uL).
27The formal solution of the game is standard and follows the same reasoning as in Section (3).
Details are available upon request.
16
Thus, we obtain the corresponding equilibrium variables:28
p˜sH = u¯β
s+ 1
s+ 4
and p˜sL =
1
2
u¯β
s+ 1
s+ 7
,
x˜sH =
1
3
β
s+ 7
s+ 4
and x˜sL =
1
6
β
s+ 7
s+ 4
,
p˜isH =
1
3
u¯β2 (s+ 1)
s+ 7
(s+ 4)2
and p˜isL =
1
12
u¯β2
s+ 1
s+ 4
. (14)
Both equilibrium prices and the optimal quality of the more polluting firm u˜sL in-
crease with the subsidy rate s, while the equilibrium market share of each producer
decrease with s. Indeed, the subsidy induces the dirty firm to improve the qual-
ity of its variant. This immediately affects the corresponding equilibrium price p˜sL
which, indeed, turns out to be higher, the higher is the subsidy rate. Since prices
are strategic complements, the higher is the equilibrium price p˜sL, the higher is the
equilibrium price of the rival p˜sH . At these high prices, however, firms serve less con-
sumers than in the framework without subsidy. The positive effect of the subsidy on
equilibrium profits develops along these price driver and market share driver with
the former prevailing over the latter. The reduction of both quantities, joint with
the increase in the brown environmental quality, also explains why subsidizing green
consumption is always effective in reducing emissions, which formally write as
E˜s =
1
2
β
7u0 − 6u¯+ (u0 − u¯)s
s+ 4
, (15)
with ∂E˜
s
∂s
< 0.
These results come with no surprise since subsidying consumers increase their
willingness to pay. It is by far more questionable whether this subsidy has to be pre-
ferred over the tax. Indeed, while both fiscal instruments escape from the unpleasant
relocation effect, it is not clear which one is more effective in terms of environmental
protection (and possibly in terms of incentive to innovate) while the former calls for
financial resources that, in principle, could be burdened by all citizens, the carbon
tax is targeted to brown consumers and it induces tax revenues.
From comparing the equilibrium configurations emerging under subsidy and tax
on consumption, by assuming that t = s, we can state the following. Define:
u˘ (t) ≡ 1
3t2
(
2t2 − 4− 11t+ (4 + t)
√
5t+ t2 + 1
)
with u˘ (t) < 0 for any t < t¯ with t¯ = 0.88316.
28We check that at this equilibrium the market is an uncovered duopoly.
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Proposition 3. When considering consumers-based fiscal measures, emissions un-
der tax are lower than the corresponding ones under subsidy whenever the cleaner
variant is sufficiently green, namely u¯
u0
> u˘ (t) . Since u˘ (t) < 0 for any t < t¯, then
u¯
u0
> u˘ (t) always holds whenever the fiscal measure is not extremely significant.
Further, the optimal quality of the brown variant is higher under relative tax than
under subsidy, so that u˜tL > u˜
s
L.
Proof. See Appendix (8.2.1).
The rationale underlying the effectiveness of the subsidy compared to the tax
in reducing emissions, is that, for s = t, the market share of the green producer
is larger under tax than under subsidy, namely x˜tH > x˜
s
H , while the reverse holds
for the market share of brown producer, so that x˜sL > x˜
t
L.
29 Thus, the net effect
on global emissions depends on the relative contribution of every component.30 In
particular, only when a Government plans a massive fiscal intervention (t ≥ t¯) in a
country where the green producer is not so environmentally virtuous, then a relative
subsidy should be preferred over a relative tax from an environmental viewpoint,
since the former would reduce emissions more than the latter. In this case however,
there exists a trade-off between advancements in green technologies and emissions
abatement: the subsidy is more effective only with respect to latter goal while being
dominated by the tax with respect to the other.31
5.2 Subsidy and green production
We finally consider the effect of the subsidy on the environment when it is targeted
to the green firm, as it is quite often observed in reality.
29A larger demand from the low income consumer is faced under subsidy, in spite of the higher
price of the dirty variant (p˜sL > p˜
t
L). Indeed, the price gap under subsidy is larger than the
corresponding gap under tax. Thus, the dirty variant is relatively cheaper under subsidy than
under tax. It immediately follows that, ceteris paribus, some consumers, buying under tax the
green variant, prefer to buy under subsidy the dirty variant with an immediate expansion of the
equilibrium market share for the dirty producer.
30The incentive to improve the quality of the dirty variant is always higher under a relative
tax than under a relative subsidy. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, the damage determined by the
brown producer is by far less significant in the case of tax than in the alternative scenario with the
subsidy.
31In Appendix (8.2.2), we also compare consumers and producers surplus under these two sce-
narios.
18
To this aim, we introduce the relative subsidy in the firm H’s profit which, thus,
writes as pifsH (pH , pL; s) = x
fs
H
(
pH + s(uH − uL)xfsL
)
. Firm L’s profit is pifsL (pH , pL; s) =
xfsL pL. Demands are x
fs
L = θ
fs
H − θfsL and xfsH = β − θfsH , where the indifferent con-
sumer types are defined as in (8).
Proceeding backwards, we first analyse price competition and then, solving for
quality competition, we characterize the equilibrium configuration. The optimal
qualities are:
u˜fsH = u and u˜
fs
L = u
3s+ 4
5s+ 7
,
with u˜fsL being increasing in s, while the equilibrium prices and market shares are
p˜fsH = βu¯
s+ 1
3s+ 4
and p˜fsL =
1
2
βu¯
s+ 1
5s+ 7
,
x˜fsH =
1
2
β (s+ 2)
5s+ 7
(2s+ 3) (3s+ 4)
and x˜fsL =
1
2
β (s+ 1)
5s+ 7
(2s+ 3) (3s+ 4)
.
The equilibrium profits write as:32
p˜ifsH =
1
2
β2u¯
(s+ 1) (s+ 2)2 (5s+ 7)
(2s+ 3) (3s+ 4)2
and p˜ifsL =
1
4
u¯β2
(s+ 1)2
(2s+ 3) (3s+ 4)
. (16)
Finally, we get the equilibrium pollution damage
E˜fs =
1
2
β
7u0 − 6u¯+ 5su0 − 4su¯
3s+ 4
. (17)
Thus, we can state the following
Proposition 4. Whenever u¯
u0
> 1
2
, (i) a relative subsidy to the green firm is detri-
mental for the environment. Further, even in the case when the firm-based fiscal plan
reduces pollution, subsidising green consumers is more effective than subsidising the
green producer in terms of (ii) incentive to innovate and (iii) emissions reduction.
Proof. See Appendix (8.2.3).
So, rather surprisingly, subsidying the green firm can raise emissions in the mar-
ket. A relative subsidy to the cleaner producer raises the optimal quality of the
dirty variant, its price and profit (
∂p˜fsL
∂s
> 0,
∂p˜ifsL
∂s
> 0). It also raises the price and
profit of the green firm (
∂p˜fsH
∂s
> 0,
∂p˜ifsH
∂s
> 0). Nonetheless, it reduces the green firm
market share at the benefit of the brown firm market share (
∂x˜fsL
∂s
> 0,
∂x˜fsH
∂s
< 0)
32We check that at this equilibrium, the market is an uncovered duopoly.
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because both prices increase with the subsidy rate, but p˜fsH increases more than p
fs
L
(formally
∂p˜fsH
∂s
>
∂p˜fsL
∂s
). As a consequence, some consumers shift from the green to
the brown variant, with an ambiguous effect on pollution damage. In particular,
when the green variant is extremely clean ( u¯
u0
> 1
2
), the reduction in emissions from
the green production is not very significant, so that the increase in the emissions
coming from the brown firm overcompensates the corresponding reduction from the
green production.33
Interestingly, the firm-based subsidy is dominated also in terms of quality im-
provement. In order to soften the disadvantage suffered under consumption subsidy,
the brown firm raises the quality of the dirty variant and thus contrasting this
penalty turns out to be stronger in this scenario than in the alternative one where
consumers’ willingness to pay is unaffected.34
6 Discussion of our main assumptions
Our analysis has been conducted under two key assumptions. First, we have consid-
ered the adoption of relative fiscal measures: the tax and the subsidy are related to
the emissions differential between goods. The second assumption regards production
costs that we have assumed to be quality-specific but non-increasing in quality.
We next discuss these assumptions and we provide, with some formal details,
some intuitions on how they could be relaxed.
6.1 Relative fiscal policy
We have modelled the fiscal incentives as a function of relative emissions: the differ-
ential between the pollution caused by the brown consumers and the pollution which
would be observed if these consumers had adopted a socially responsible behaviour,
buying the cleaner variant. Our modelling strategy resembles a sort of network effect
because, formally, consumers’ preferences also depend on what the others purchase.
However, in our approach, the share of brown consumers that appear in the utility
function only measures the (relative) contribution of socially blameworthy behav-
33This happens, for instance, when the green variant is emission-free, namely u¯ = u0. In this
extreme case, only the increase in the brown firm’s emissions takes place with no reduction of
emissions by the green firm.
34In the Appendix (8.2.4), we also compare consumer and producer surplus under these two
scenarios.
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ior on which the (relative) fiscal policy is tailored. As extensively motivated in
the introduction, these fiscal policies result from exploiting the social/psychological
drivers which inspire, at least partially, consumers’ environmental concern.35 Thus,
the monetary punishment/reward increases with the number of brown consumers
in order to discourage potential conformity behaviours towards brown consumption
(which get stronger with the pool of brown consumers)36 as well as to hinder the
environmental damage (that expands with the amount of polluting goods).
Although we are not related with this issue, it is worth noticing that in a different
perspective, our modeling framework is in line with the so called attitude-behaviour
gap . This phenomenon is well documented by the literature (Carrington et al.,
2010; Greendex, 2014): on the one hand, consumers declare to be willing to pay a
price premium for buying environmentally friendly goods; on the other hand, these
declarations do not translate into green purchases so that the market share of green
products is still rather small.37 In our approach, tax is somehow related to the
contribution that brown consumers could give to the environment when translating
their declaration about green products into actual behavior – thus generating emis-
sions which are proportional to xtLuH – and the one which they actually give when
buying the brown product – with emissions which are proportional to xtLuL.
Contributions investigating environmental quality competition and taxation in
the presence of green network effects (like Bre´card, 2013, and Greaker and Midttømme,
2016) lay, instead, on the assumption that consumers benefit from an increase in
the number of consumers buying the same environmental variant.
In our approach, the consequence of such relative policies, that depend on the
quality gap, is that their effect on quality competition is amplified with respect to
a fixed fiscal measure. Indeed firms, and in particular the more polluting firm, are
35From the 2014 Greendex Report, it emerges that consumers’ environmental awareness is
no longer restricted to more advanced countries, being rather diffused even in middle-income
economies, such as India and China, and less developed countries such as South Korea, Brazil, and
Argentina. It is also found that ”consumers who already display behavior that is relatively sus-
tainable and are told that their behavior is above average from an environmental point of view are
more motivated to improve their behavior further than are consumers who display less sustainable
habits.” (2014 Greendex Report, 3).
36See Grilo et al. (2001) for the effects of conformity in consumer behavior on market competi-
tion.
37While an increasing number of consumers declares to be concerned with environmental is-
sues, data show a significant inconsistency between these declared attitudes and consumers’ actual
behaviour (Finisterra et al., 2009; Gupta and Ogden, 2009).
21
induced to improve its environmental quality here, not only for the subsidy or tax
per se, but with the primary purpose of affecting its overall absolute value.38
Finally, let us briefly notice that these fiscal policies could be relatively easily
implemented. An example of a market where the relative tax can be applied is
the automotive sector. In this sector, manufacturers have to secure the approval
of specific emission standards passing particular tests, so that governments could
easily collect data about vehicles’ emissions. Indeed, in several countries, they al-
ready did, as documented by different environmental campaigns launched by public
authorities that, basically, rank vehicles according to their environmental impact.39
As for the market share of traditional versus electric/hybrid vehicles, data at Euro-
pean level are collected, for instance, by the European Automobile Manufacturers
Association (see http://www.acea.be/). Another industrial sector characterized by
an increasing environmental concern is agriculture, where organic food is acquiring
increasing importance in terms of production and consumption in comparison with
conventional agriculture. Different studies show that organic as compared with con-
ventional agriculture is characterized by a lower environmental impact in terms of,
for instance, preserving biodiversity, and in terms of fossil energy and water con-
sumption.40 Since 1991, with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/913 now replaced
by Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production and labelling of
organic products, the organic sector has been included in EU policies. According
to this regulation, organic products and services have to meet the EU Ecolabel re-
quirements and Member States are supposed to provide the statistical information
38Consider a scenario such that consumers’ preferences are:
UH(θ) = θuH − pH + dS, if buys H,
UL(θ) = θuL − pL + gT , if buys L,
with d = 0 and g = 1 in the tax scenario whereas d = 1 and g = 0 in the subsidy scenario;
S ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (0, 1) defined as a fixed (per-unit) subsidy and tax to green and brown
consumers, respectively. It is possible to show that such fiscal measures are at most slightly
effective at improving the quality in the market with respect to a baseline scenario a` la Choi and
Shin (1992) with no policy intervention.
39See, for instance, the Italian guidelines on CO2 emissions,
www.mit.gov.it/mit/site.php?p=cm&o=vd&id=2724; the EPA Smart Way Program in
the US, www.epa.gov/smartway/basic-info/index.htm; the Australian Green Vehicle Guide,
http://www.greenvehicleguide.gov.au/GVGPublicUI/home.aspx.
40See, among others, the report at
http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/files/biodiversita/8Agricolturabiologica.pdf as well as Tuomisto
et al., (2012) and Mondelaers et al., (2009).
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necessary for its implementation and monitoring. Indeed, according to Eurostat
data, the organic sector, both in terms of cultivated area and number of organic
products, has been rapidly expanding during the past years.41
6.2 Innovation costs
Our paper is mainly devoted to capture the demand-driven effects of relative fiscal
measures on the equilibrium configuration of the market. Accordingly, the assump-
tion of costs which are fixed in quantity, from a theoretical viewpoint, represents a
natural entry point for the analysis. So far, we have introduced the simplest quality
specific cost structure Fi, i = H,L. This assumption is rather reasonable when
describing sectors where firms incur only cost of technology adoption, as in Andre´
et al. (2009).42
In line with the literature on abatement effort, we next provide some insights
on an alternative specification of costs that are increasing and convex in quality.43
Thus, they write as
u2H
2
. We explore the role of these costs when they are only
incurred for the green production.44
It is worthy noticing that profit function of the brown firm remains unchanged
and, in turn, the functional relation between the two variants is unaffected. However,
the high quality firm no longer chooses the available top quality in the market, so
that, for any given scenario, the average environmental quality decreases.
To check the robustness of our results, by taking into account the above described
relations, we have implemented numerical simulation and, thus, obtained the optimal
green quality and, hence, the brown quality, both firms’ profits and the pollution
damage at equilibrium.45 As we will show, our main crucial findings are robust to
this alternative specification.
41See the report at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/Organic 2016 web new.pdf for an-
indepth overview of the organic agriculture in the European Union.
42See Andre´ et al. (2009) for further details on this.
43This modeling structure can be reconciled with the approach where ui captures the abatement
effort of firms. In this alternative perspective the abatement effort affects the emission intensity
of goods. Accordingly, the lower the emission intensity per unit of production, the higher the
environmental quality of the product. See, for example, Moraga-Gonzalez and Padro-Fumero
(2002) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005). The abatement cost in this literature is convex.
44Given the mathematical complexity added to the model with this new assumption, in order to
get a comparable intuition, we decided to disregard the costs of brown production.
45See the Appendix 8.3 for details on the implementation of the numerical simulations.
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The main points of our baseline model hold, as we argue in the following Propo-
sition.
Proposition 5. With convex quality costs, (i) a relative tax on brown consumption
improves the environmental quality and reduces global emissions without affecting
firms’ profits. Comparing this consumption tax with a firm-based tax, in the latter
case (ii) the optimal quality of the brown variant is lower; (iii) emissions can be
larger; and (iv) the brown firm is damaged. Finally, (v) taxing brown consumption
can be more environmental effective than subsidizing green consumption.
Even introducing quality-specific costs which are increasing and convex, we can
conclude that a tax on brown consumption can be preferred over a tax on brown
production. Indeed, the former induces a larger environmental quality improvement
than the latter, i.e., u˜tL > u˜
ft
L . Also, whenever β takes large values we observe that,
for high values of the distance between the optimal green quality and the emission-
free quality u0, ceteris paribus, E˜ft > E˜t. Finally, as for the profits, a relative tax on
production, in contrast with a tax on consumption, may induce firms to relocate.46
Moreover, when comparing tax on consumption versus subsidy, we confirm that,
in line with the baseline model, the former measure can be more effective than
the latter. In particular, concerning the environmental quality improvement, under
consumer-based fiscal measures, we obtain that for relatively high values of β, the
brown quality is higher under tax, u˜tL > u˜
s
L as in the baseline model. The result is
reversed, however that is, u˜sL > u˜
t
L, for relatively low values of β. The intuition for
the role of β is that when the average WTP for environmental quality is large, it can
compensate for the larger quality costs that we observe with respect to the baseline
model and things remain qualitatively the same. By contrast, for low values of β,
this compensating effect does not take place and it is the subsidy that, increasing the
relative WTP for the green variant induces a larger quality improvement. Finally,
when u¯
u0
is small, we observe that emissions under subsidy are higher than those
observed under tax, namely E˜s > E˜t. Even this finding is consistent with the analysis
in the baseline model.
46For the sake of completeness, we report in the Appendix 8.3 the remaining scenarios compar-
isons: subsidy and green consumption versus subsidy and green production.
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7 Conclusions
We have shown in our analysis that, contrary to what has been somehow argued
in the past decades, consumers can play a key role in pollution abatement. In par-
ticular, whenever the social content of green consumption is recognized to be an
essential driver to consumers’ behavior, the policy maker can define a fiscal policy
in such a way to pursue, simultaneously, the twofold aim of enhancing green innova-
tion and abating emissions. Rather surprisingly, this ambitious goal can be reached
more easily when consumers are the core target of a fiscal measure than in the alter-
native, and more traditional scenario, where firms are the direct recipients of fiscal
tool. While in EU, public opinion is divided on the urgency of facing environmental
problems and the risk of causing firms’relocation and thus job losses, under Trump’s
administration, the debate centers around a conservative climate solution, such as
a carbon border tax which could ”strengthen our economy, benefit working-class
Americans, reduce regulations, protect our natural heritage and consolidate a new
era of Republican leadership”. In this paper, we have proposed a market-based
rationale where firms contribute to determine a monetary reward/ punishment to
consumers, while consumers provide firms with the incentive to increase the envi-
ronmental quality of their goods. Interestingly, although this mechanism is in line
with the desirable polluters pay principle, it escapes from the evoked relocation effect
since reward and punishment do not depend on the place where goods are produced,
being related only to their social content.
We acknowledge that a natural argument against our approach is that in our
model the tax is imposed on brown consumers, which traditionally consists of low-
income people. Thus, it penalizes the weakest class in the society. Nonetheless,
we argue that our perspective can benefit this class along two different dimensions.
First, this tax reduces emissions thereby generating healthy benefits to all citizens.
Moreover, quite often, the more polluted areas are the ones where low-income cit-
izens live. Thus, reducing emissions can curb urban blight and, as a consequence,
mitigate the environmental degradation which is particularly significant in these ar-
eas. Second, the tax revenue generated by this carbon tax can be earmarked for
improving the living standards of low-income citizens. For example, tax revenue can
(i) consolidate social assistance programs and improve access of low-income families
to education and health services, in developing countries; (ii) or reduce regressive tax
exemptions and provide some monetary benefits after retirement to the poors with
rather short life expectancy, in developed countries. Whatever the redistributive
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policy, our approach opens the door to the possibility of compensating the brown
consumers, after taxation.
8 Appendix
8.1 Carbon tax and brown consumption
8.1.1 Proof Lemma 2
Proof. First, we find that ∂
∂uH
piftH (uH , uL; t) > 0, always. The optimal choice of
firm H is then uftH = u. As for firm L, pi
ft
L is concave in uL. The first derivative is:
∂
∂uL
piftL (uH , uL; t) > 0 ⇐⇒ (3t− 7)u3L+2uH (−10t+ t2 + 2)u2L−12tu2H (t− 1)uL+
8t2u3H > 0. Set
uL
uH
= Q ∈ (0, 1), the sign of the derivative is as the sign of f (Q, t):
f (Q, t) = (3t− 7)Q3 + 2Q2 (−10t+ t2 + 2)− 12tQ (t− 1) + 8t2. (18)
Given the concavity of piftL wrt uL and, in turn, wrt to Q, and given that f
(
4
7
, t
)
> 0
and f (0.691, t) < 0, we can state that there exists a Qft (t) =
u˜ftL
u
∈ (4
7
, 0.691
)
such
that ∂
∂uL
piftL (uH , uL; t) > 0 for Q < Q
ft (t), ∂
∂uL
piftL (uH , uL; t) = 0 for Q = Q
ft (t)
and ∂
∂uL
piftL (uH , uL; t) < 0 for Q > Q
ft (t).
8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We split the proof in three parts:
(i) Recall that the optimal quality gap in case of tax is levied on brown consump-
tion is:
u˜tL
u¯
= 2
7
(
1− t+√5t+ t2 + 1). This is increasing and concave in t. It
takes value 4
7
, which is its minimal value, in t = 0, it takes value 0.756 in t = 1.
In order to show that Qft (t) = u˜L(t)
u
<
u˜tL
u¯
, it is sufficient that the sign of (18),
computed in
u˜tL
u¯
, is negative: f
(
u˜tL
u¯
, t
)
= 8
343
√
5t+ t2 + 1 (−32t2 − 5t3 + 7 + 30t) +
8
343
(5t+ t2 + 1)
3
2 (3t− 7) + t (t− 1) (31t+ 2t2 + 2) < 0. This holds for any t > 0.
(ii) Formally, both damages, E˜t defined in (7) and E˜ft defined in (11), are decreasing
and convex in t and they take the same value in the absence of fiscal policy, i.e. in
t = 0 when u˜tL = u˜
ft
L . Numerical simulations show:
47
47We consider several values for t ∈ (0, 1). For a given t we derive the equilibrium value of
uL = u
ft
L from equation (18) and we compare pollution damages. Details are available upon
request from the authors.
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E˜t − E˜ft < 0 ⇐⇒ u
u0
< û (t) ,
with û (t) increasing in t and such that û (t) ∈ (0.5, 0.721), where û (0) = 0.5 and
û (1) = 0.721. Recall from Lemma 2 that
u˜ftL
u
takes value equal to 4/7 in t = 0 and
0.691 in t = 1.
(iii) Partial derivatives reveal that
∂piftH
∂t
= 8β2u¯3u2L (u¯− uL) uL+tu¯(−u2L+4u¯uL+4tu2H−2tu¯uL)3 > 0
∂piftL
∂t
= β2u¯2u2L (u¯− uL) 3u
2
L−4u¯uL−4tu2H+2tu¯uL
(−u2L+4u¯uL+4tu¯2−2tu¯uL)
3 < 0.
Notice that
∂piftH
∂t
> 0 and
∂piftL
∂t
< 0 for any uL and so, a fortiori, for the equilibrium
quality
u˜ftL
u¯
∈ (4
7
, 0.691
)
8.1.3 Consumption tax versus production tax
When comparing consumers surplus and firms profits, it emerges that, (i) for the
high quality segment as well as overall, consumers surplus is higher under relative tax
to the brown producer than under tax to brown consumers. In contrast, consumers
of the low quality good prefer to be taxed than buying from a taxed (and brown) firm.
Finally, (ii) firms are better off when the tax is on brown consumers than on the
brown producer.
Proof. (i) Consumers surplus under relative taxation on brown consumption for the
high quality segment (C˜S
t
H), for the low quality segment (C˜S
t
L) and overall (C˜S
t
TOT )
are, respectively:
C˜S
t
H =
77
32
β2u¯
(
√
5t+t2+1(2t−2)−3t−2t2−2)2
(2
√
5t+t2+1−2t−5)2(2
√
5t+t2+1+5t+2)
2 (19a)
C˜S
t
L =
49
112
β2u¯
(
√
5t+t2+1−t+1)(2
√
5t+t2+1+3t−2t√5t+t2+1+2t2+2)
(2t−2
√
5t+t2+1+5)
2
(2
√
5t+t2+1+5t+2)
2 (19b)
C˜S
t
TOT =
1
96
β2u¯
−14(−21t+18t2+44t3−48)
√
5t+t2+1+(1974t−1281t2+1792t3+616t4+672)
−12(t−1)(3t+2t2+2)√5t+t2+1+(72t−45t2+72t3+24t4+24)
(19c)
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Similarly, for the firm-based tax scenario, they are, with uL = u˜
ft
L :
C˜S
ft
H = 2β
2
2 (uL + tu¯) (u
2
L + u¯uL + tu¯
2)
(−u2L + 4u¯uL + 4tu¯2 − 2tu¯uL)2
C˜S
ft
L = β
2 u¯
2u3L (u¯− uL)2
2 (u¯− uL)2 (−u2L + 4u¯uL + 4tu¯2 − 2u¯uL)2
C˜S
ft
TOT =
1
2
β2u¯2
4u¯u2L + 4t
2u¯3 + 5u3L + 4tu¯u
2
L + 8tu¯
2uL
(−u2L + 4u¯uL + 4tu¯2 − 2tu¯uL)2
Numerical simulations show the following:48
C˜S
t
H − C˜S
ft
H < 0, C˜S
t
L − C˜S
ft
L > 0, C˜S
t
TOT − C˜S
ft
TOT < 0.
(ii) Comparing (5) with (10) and (6) with (9), we find that, for any uL and so,
a fortiori, for the equilibrium
u˜ftL
u¯
∈ (4
7
, 0.691
)
:
p˜itH−piftH = −
1
48
β2u¯
4u¯2(20u¯2−7u2L−20u¯uL)t2+4u¯uL(40u¯2−7u2L−54u¯uL)t+u2L(4u¯−7uL)(20u¯+uL)
(−u2L+4u¯uL+4tu¯2−2tu¯uL)
2 > 0,
p˜itL − piftL =
1
48
β2u¯
4u¯2(2u¯−uL)2t2+4u¯uL(8u¯2+13u2L−18u¯uL)t+u2L(4u¯−7uL)2
(−u2L+4u¯uL+4tu¯2−2tu¯uL)
2 > 0.
8.2 Carbon tax or green subsidies?
8.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
E˜t − E˜s = 1
12
β−4u
0+2t2u0−3t2u¯+4u0√5t+t2+1−11tu0+tu0√5t+t2+1
t(t+4)
.
From standard algebra, we get that E˜t > E˜s for any u¯
u0
< u˘ (t)
with u˘ (t) = 1
3t2
(
2t2 − 4 + (4 + t)√5t+ t2 + 1− 11t) strictly less than 1. Since(
2t2 − 4 + (4 + t)
√
5t+ t2 + 1− 11t
)
< 0
whenever t < t¯, with t¯ = 0.883 16, then u¯
u0
< u˘ (t) is never satisfied if t < t¯.
Then, under the assumption that s = t, u˜sL− u˜tL = 17 u¯19t−14
√
5t+t2+1−2t√5t+t2+1+2t2+14
t+7
.
48We consider several values for t ∈ (0, 1). For a given t we derive the equilibrium value of
uL = u
ft
L from equation (18) and we proceed with the comparisons of the consumer surpluses.
Details are available upon request from the authors.
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Notice also that u˜tL − u˜sL = 0 in the absence of fiscal policy. Further, it holds that
∂(u˜tL − u˜sL)
∂t
=
168t− (2t2 + 119 + 28t)√5t+ t2 + 1 + 33t2 + 2t3 + 245
(t+ 7)2
√
5t+ t2 + 1
< 0.
So, since u˜sL pt=0= u˜tL pt=0 and the difference u˜tL− u˜sL is increasing in t, it immediately
follows that u˜tL > u˜
s
L for any t ∈]0, 1].
8.2.2 Consumers and producers surplus
When comparing consumers surplus and firms profits, it emerges that, (i) consumers
surplus is higher under relative tax than under subsidy. In contrast, (ii) firms are
better off when the consumers are subsidied.
Proof. Consumers surpluses under consumers taxation are provided in subsection
(8.1.3). Let us define consumers surplus under relative subsidy on consumers
C˜S
s
H =
1
18
β2 (s+ 7) u¯ 2s+11
(s+4)2
,
C˜S
s
L =
1
72
β2u¯ s+7
s+4
,
C˜S
s
TOT =
1
24
β2u¯ (s+ 7) 3s+16
(s+4)2
.
(i) First, consider the total consumers surplus under the two scenarios.
C˜S
t
TOT−C˜S
s
TOT =
u¯t
288
β2−1152H−5184t−806Ht
2+1484Ht3+328Ht4−2304Ht+6062t2−2043t3−2304t4−328t5−1152
(t+4)2(−8H−24t+4Ht2+8Ht3−4Ht+15t2−24t3−8t4−8)
with H =
√
5t+ t2 + 1. Now we evaluate the numerator ∆ and the denomina-
tor Λ, with ∆ = (328t4 + 1484t3 − 806t2 − 2304t− 1152)H + (6062t2 − 2304t4 −
2043t3 − 328t5 − 5184t − 1152) < 0 and Λ = (t+ 4)2 (8t3 + 4t2 − 4t− 8)H +
(15t2 − 24t3 − 8t4 − 24t− 8) < 0. We conclude that
C˜S
t
TOT − C˜S
s
TOT > 0.
Let us compare the surpluses of consumers buying the high quality variant.
C˜S
T
H−C˜S
S
H =
1
288
β2u¯
(−9t(31t+184)(8t3+4t2−4t−8))
√
5t+t2+1+9t(31t+184)(8t4+24t3−15t2+24t+8)
(t+4)2(12(1−t)(3t+2t2+2)
√
5t+t2+1+(24t4+72t3−45t2+72t+24)) .
After some algebraic simplifications, we get
C˜S
T
H − C˜S
S
H =
1
96
tβ2u¯
31t+ 184
(t+ 4)2
> 0.
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Finally, for consumers buying the low quality variant, we obtain
C˜S
s
L − C˜S
t
L = −
1
144
β2u¯
3t((153t+148t2+16t3−72)
√
t2+5t+1−(27t+481t2+188t3+16t4+72))
(12(1−t)(3t+2t2+2))√t2+5t+1+(72t−45t2+72t3+24t4+24) .
Let us evaluate the denominator Ψ,
Ψ = (−12 (t− 1) (3t+ 2t2 + 2))√t2 + 5t+ 1 + (72t− 45t2 + 72t3 + 24t4 + 24) > 0
for any t, and thus Ψ > 0 always holds. Consider now the numerator ∇
∇ = (153t+ 148t2 + 16t3 − 72)√t2 + 5t+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−(27t+ 481t2 + 188t3 + 16t4 + 72)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
First notice that B > 0 always holds. Consider the case A − B < 0, a fortiori
A2 − B2 < 0 for any A > 0. Otherwise, for any A < 0, a fortiori A − B < 0
holds. Accordingly, it is sufficient to verify that A2 −B2 < 0 in order to prove that
A−B < 0 and thus ∇ < 0.
A2 −B2 = −21 609t2 (t+ 8) < 0.
Summing up, with Ψ > 0 and ∇ < 0, we conclude that C˜SsL − C˜S
t
L > 0.
(ii) p˜itH − p˜isH = − 316su¯β2 s+8(s+4)2 < 0 and p˜itL − p˜isL = − 116su¯ β
2
s+4
< 0.
8.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We divided the proof of proposition 4 in three parts
(i) From pollution damage defined in (17), it emerges that
∂
∂s
E˜fs = −1
2
β u
0−2u¯
(3s+4)2
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ u0 > 2u¯ ⇐⇒ u¯
u0
≤ 1
2
: subsidizing the green firm is
effective in reducing pollution emission if and only if the top environmental quality
available in the market and chosen by the high quality firm is sufficiently lower than
the emission-free quality benchmark.
(ii) For any given s, simple comparison reveals:
u˜sL − u˜fsL = u¯
(
s+4
s+7
− 3s+4
5s+7
)
= u¯2s s+1
(s+7)(5s+7)
> 0.
(iii) Direct computations show, for a given s equal in the two scenarios:
E˜s − E˜fs = −1
2
sβ
2u0 + 2su0 − su
(s+ 4) (3s+ 4)
< 0.
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8.2.4 Consumption versus production subsidy
Direct comparisons show that (i) consumer surplus is higher when the subsidy is on
the green producer rather than on green consumption, (ii) on the contrary, producer
surplus is higher when the subsidy is on green consumption.
Proof. (i) Consumer surplus under consumer-based subsidy is defined in subsection
(8.2.2). For the firm-based scenario, we define, similarly:
C˜S
fs
H = β
2u¯
(31s+ 11s2 + 22) (s+ 2) (5s+ 7)
8 (2s+ 3)2 (3s+ 4)2
,
C˜S
fs
L = β
2u¯
(5s+ 7) (s+ 1)2
8 (2s+ 3)2 (3s+ 4)
,
C˜S
fs
TOT =
1
8
β2u¯ (5s+ 7)
(21s+ 7s2 + 16)
(2s+ 3) (3s+ 4)2
.
Comparisons show the following:
C˜S
s
H − C˜S
fs
H = − 172sβ2u¯ (23s+ 32) 20s+113s
2+66s3+9s4−48
(3s+4)2(2s+3)2(s+4)2
< 0 ⇐⇒ s > 0.504 98;
C˜S
s
L − C˜S
fs
L = − 172sβ2u¯344s+197s
2+33s3+186
(s+4)(3s+4)(2s+3)2
< 0;
C˜S
s
TOT − C˜S
fs
TOT = − 124sβ2u¯784s+954s
2+411s3+51s4+160
(2s+3)(s+4)2(3s+4)2
< 0.
(ii) As for firms, comparing profits under consumer subsidy, defined in (14) with
those under firm subsidy, defined in (16), we find:
p˜isH − p˜ifsH = −
1
6
u¯β2 (s+ 1) 1424s+1274s
2+630s3+165s4+15s5+672
(2s+3)(s+4)2(3s+4)2
< 0,
p˜isL − p˜ifsL =
1
12
su¯β2 (s+ 1) 3s+2
(3s+4)(2s+3)(s+4)
> 0.
As for the producer surplus’ comparison, Πs = p˜isH + p˜i
s
L versus Π
fs = p˜ifsH + p˜i
fs
L , we
find:
Πs − Πfs = − 1
12
u¯β2 (s+ 1) 640s+396s
2+138s3+15s4+448
(s+4)2(3s+4)2
< 0.
8.3 Convex quality costs: numerical simulations
The optimization problem of the brown firm does not vary with the introduction
of convex quality costs faced by the green firm. Accordingly, we have implemented
numerical simulations based on the relation between the high and low quality vari-
ants coming from the best reply function of the brown firm. Further, for sake of
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comparability, we have considered the same rate s = t ∈ (0, 1). In this analysis, uH
is assumed to be in the interval (0.1, 10), while different values have been attributed
to the parameters of the model (i.e. β, s and t). More in detail, from a uniform
distribution (i.e. uH ∼ U (0.1, 10)), we have drawn randomly 500 uH-values which
profile the profits curve trend. Among these uH-values, we have selected those
which are profit maximizing for any couple of β, t values. The maximal WTP β
takes the following values β = [2, 4, 6, 8, 10] while the tax/subsidy rate is assumed
to be t = [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8]. For the comparisons of the pollution damages in the
different scenarios, we assume u¯ = 10, so that u0 ≥ 10. Here, results of numerical
simulation are presented consistently with the structure of the model with quality-
specific fixed production cost. Details on numerical results are provided in Annex I:
optimal qualities are reported in Table I while firm’s profits and pollution damage
are respectively in Table II and Table III.
First, when considering convex quality costs on the green variant, u˜tL is still
increasing in t. Further, the fiscal plan does not have any impact on firms profits.
Also, the benefit of taxing brown consumption in terms of environmental quality is
robust to this alternative specification of production costs.
In particular, from the comparison between taxation on consumers and produc-
ers, numerical simulations show that u˜tL > u˜
ft
L is always verified for any couple
of β, t−values, as in the corresponding model with fixed costs. Moreover, we find
that, in line with the baseline model, pollution damage under production tax can
be higher than the corresponding tax on consumers, namely E˜ft > E˜t. Whenever
the ratio between the optimal qualities and the emission-free quality – when this
latter is set at its minimum value – is relatively low, (i.e. max
{
u˜ft
u0
, u˜
t
u0
}
< 0.527
with u0 = u¯ = 10), we observe E˜ft > E˜t. Notice that this occurs for β ≤ 6, irre-
spective of the tax rate. However when both u˜
ft
u0
and u˜
t
u0
are closer to 1, namely
the distance between the optimal qualities and the emission-free quality is relatively
small, the reverse holds and thus E˜ft < E˜t. However, if we allow for a higher value
of u0, for example u0 > 21.604, a relative tax on brown producers always leads to
larger pollution damage than in case of consumers taxation.
Concerning profits, irrespective of the β, t−values, we observe p˜itL > p˜iftL with p˜iftL
decreasing in t, and p˜itH > p˜i
ft
H holds for relatively low value of t (i.e. t < 0.6).
From the comparison between consumer-based fiscal measures, it emerges that
the brown quality is higher under tax than under subsidy for relatively high values
of β. This is rather reasonable, since the role of quality-dependent convex cost is
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mitigated by the highest WTP.
Concerning the pollution damage, a relative subsidy on consumption results in
a larger pollution damage than taxation for a high value of β or for low values of
both β and subsidy/tax rate; indeed E˜s > E˜t always holds when β = 10 or β = 2
with t = 0.2 or t = 0.4. For the other β, t values, the result strictly depends on the
difference (u0 − uH): increasing values of this difference result in a wider range of
parameters for which E˜s > E˜t is observed.
For sake of completeness, we have compared the two alternative scenarios on
green subsidy, namely (i) green subsidy on consumers vsus green subsidy on producer
and (ii) taxation on producer vsus subsidy on producer.
As far as the former scenario is concerned, when evaluating a green subsidy on
consumers and producers, simulations show that u˜sL > u˜
fs
L and E˜
fs > E˜s are always
verified, consistently with the analysis in the baseline model.
As for the latter case, when comparing the firm-based measures, it emerges that
the low quality variant is higher under taxation than in case of green subsidies on
producers for a relatively high (resp. low) value of β, namely u˜ftL > u˜
fs
L (resp. lower,
u˜fsL > u˜
ft
L ), regardless of the tax rate. For the pollution damage, E˜
fs > E˜ft holds
in the following cases: β = (2; 10), β = 4 with t = 0.2 and t = 0.6 and β = 8 with
t = (0.4; 0.6; 0.8) . For all the remaining cases, the ranking depends on the value of
u0: when u0 is larger, the range of parameters such that E˜fs > E˜ft holds increases.
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Annex I, Table I
Optimal qualities
β= consumers’ willingness to pay; t= tax/subsidy rate; u˜tH= high quality under relative taxation
on brown consumption; u˜tL= low quality under relative taxation on brown consumption; u˜
ft
H=
high quality under relative taxation on brown production; u˜ftL = low quality under relative
taxation on brown production; u˜sH= high quality under relative subsidy on green consump-
tion; u˜sL= low quality under relative subsidy on brown production; u˜
sf
H = high quality under
relative subsidy on green production; u˜sfL = low quality under relative subsidy on green production.
(β, t) u˜tH u˜
t
L u˜
ft
H u˜
ft
L u˜
s
H u˜
s
L u˜
fs
H u˜
fs
L
(2,0.2) 0.578 0.368 0.581 0.362 0.650 0.379 0.646 0.371
(2,0.4) 0.578 0.393 0.590 0.384 0.715 0.425 0.701 0.405
(2,0.6) 0.578 0.411 0.588 0.393 0.753 0.456 0.765 0.444
(2,0.8) 0.578 0.425 0.581 0.396 0.812 0.500 0.823 0.479
(4,0.2) 2.329 1.482 2.319 1.444 2.622 1.520 2.586 1.487
(4,0.4) 2.329 1.821 2.331 1.516 2.855 1.697 2.826 1.633
(4,0.6) 2.329 1.655 2.306 1.541 3.075 1.861 3.061 1.776
(4,0.8) 2.329 1.713 2.336 1.591 3.250 2.000 3.298 1.919
(6,0.2) 5.252 3.343 5.217 3.250 5.870 3.424 5.813 3.342
(6,0.4) 5.252 3.567 5.237 3.406 6.436 3.826 6.357 3.673
(6,0.6) 5.252 3.733 5.247 3.507 6.912 4.183 6.893 3.998
(6,0.8) 5.252 3.864 5.273 3.592 7.323 4.506 7.416 4.315
(8,0.2) 9.327 5.938 9.293 5.789 9.937 5.797 9.999 5.750
(8,0.4) 9.327 6.336 9.286 6.040 9.937 5.909 9.999 5.778
(8,0.6) 9.327 6.630 9.332 6.237 9.937 6.015 9.999 5.800
(8,0.8) 9.327 6.861 9.374 6.385 9.937 6.115 9.999 5.818
(10,0.2) 9.327 6.326 9.998 6.228 9.937 5.797 9.999 5.750
(10,0.4) 9.327 6.750 9.962 6.480 9.937 5.909 9.999 5.778
(10,0.6) 9.327 7.064 9.984 6.674 9.937 6.015 9.999 5.800
(10,0.8) 9.327 7.311 9.989 6.804 9.937 6.115 9.999 5.818
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Annex I, Table II
Firms’profits
β= Consumers’ willingness to pay; t= Tax/Subsidy rate; p˜itH= profit of firm H under relative tax-
ation on brown consumption; p˜itL= profit of firm L under relative taxation on brown consumption;
p˜iftH = profit of firm L under relative taxation on brown production; p˜i
ft
L = profit firm L under relative
taxation on brown production; p˜isH= profit of firm H under relative subsidy on green consumption;
p˜isL= profit of firm L under relative subsidy on brown production; p˜i
sf
H = profit of firm H under rela-
tive subsidy on green production; p˜isfL = profit of firm L under relative subsidy on green production.
(β, t) p˜itH p˜i
t
L p˜i
ft
H p˜i
ft
L p˜i
s
H p˜i
s
L p˜i
sf
H p˜i
sf
L
(2,0.2) 0.170 0.048 0.168 0.040 0.213 0.062 0.209 0.060
(2,0.4) 0.170 0.048 0.169 0.035 0.255 0.076 0.249 0.070
(2,0.6) 0.170 0.048 0.170 0.030 0.293 0.087 0.293 0.080
(2,0.8) 0.170 0.048 0.172 0.027 0.330 0.102 0.339 0.091
(4,0.2) 2.722 0.776 2.690 0.634 3.412 0.999 3.337 0.953
(4,0.4) 2.722 0.776 2.703 0.546 4.073 1.211 3.991 1.121
(4,0.6) 2.722 0.776 2.724 0.474 4.697 1.426 4.688 1.287
(4,0.8) 2.722 0.776 2.746 0.429 5.281 1.625 5.430 1.452
(6,0.2) 13.781 3.939 13.616 3.209 17.273 5.032 16.893 4.817
(6,0.4) 13.781 3.939 13.683 2.759 20.618 6.143 20.205 5.675
(6,0.6) 13.781 3.939 13.790 2.426 23.777 7.213 23.734 6.520
(6,0.8) 13.781 3.939 13.899 2.177 26.736 8.238 27.491 7.346
(8,0.2) 43.556 12.436 43.032 10.163 54.460 15.143 53.334 14.731
(8,0.4) 43.556 12.436 43.245 8.696 64.069 16.863 63.011 15.870
(8,0.6) 43.556 12.436 43.582 7.672 72.453 18.435 72.484 16.814
(8,0.8) 43.556 12.436 43.928 6.881 79.810 19.875 81.819 17.608
(10,0.2) 95.544 20.703 94.944 17.084 112.867 23.660 111.456 23.017
(10,0.4) 95.544 20.703 95.141 14.577 127.882 26.349 126.577 24.797
(10,0.6) 95.544 20.703 95.806 12.825 140.981 28.804 141.378 26.272
(10,0.8) 95.544 20.703 96.404 11.457 152.477 31.054 155.965 27.512
35
Annex I, Table III
Pollution damage
β= consumers’ willingness to pay; t= tax/subsidy rate; E˜t= pollution damage under relative
taxation on brown consumption; E˜ft= pollution damage under relative taxation on brown
production; E˜s= pollution damage under relative subsidy on green consumers; E˜fs= pollution
damage under relative subsidy on green production.
(β, t) E˜t E˜ft E˜s E˜fs
(2,0.2) 1.690u0-0.867 1.709u0-0.890 1.714u0-0.960 1.739u0-0.955
(2,0.4) 1.657u0-0.867 1.689u0-0.914 1.682u0-1.040 1.731u0-1.024
(2,0.6) 1.636u0-0.867 1.676u0-0.918 1.652u0-1.080 1.724u0-1.108
(2,0.8) 1.620u0-0.867 1.667u0-0.911 1.625u0-1.150 1.719u0-1.183
(4,0.2) 3.381u0-6.987 3.419u0-7.107 3.429u0-7.742 3.478u0-7.647
(4,0.4) 3.315u0-6.987 3.378u0-7.221 3.364u0-8.305 3.461u0-8.260
(4,0.6) 3.271u0-6.987 2.240u0-5.408 3.304u0-8.824 3.448u0-8.867
(4,0.8) 3.240u0-6.987 3.334u0-7.326 3.250u0-9.208 3.437u0-9.483
(6,0.2) 5.071u0-23.633 5.128u0-23.982 5.143u0-25.997 5.217u0-25.778
(6,0.4) 4.972u0-23.633 5.066u0-24.340 5.045u0-28.084 5.192u0-27.874
(6,0.6) 4.907u0-23.633 5.028u0-24.558 4.957u0-29.754 5.172u0-29.949
(6,0.8) 4.859u0-23.633 5.002u0-24.802 4.875u0-31.122 5.156u0-31.983
(8,0.2) 6.761u0-55.962 6.838u0-56.962 6.857u0-58.678 6.956u0-59.128
(8,0.4) 6.629u0-55.962 6.755u0-57.547 6.727u0-57.817 6.923u0-58.459
(8,0.6) 6.542u0-55.962 6.704u0-58.236 6.609u0-57.032 6.897u0-57.929
(8,0.8) 6.479u0-55.962 6.669u0-58.786 6.500u0-56.312 6.875u0-57.498
(10,0.2) 8.451u0-74.531 8.547u0-76.605 8.571u0-73.347 8.6957u0-73.91
(10,0.4) 8.287u0-74.530 8.444u0-77.170 8.409u0-72.272 8.654u0-73.074
(10,0.6) 8.178u0-74.530 8.380u0-77.883 8.261u0-71.290 8.621u0-72.411
(10,0.8) 8.099u0-74.530 8.336u0-78.305 8.125u0-70.390 8.594u0-71.872
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